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COMMENTS
LABOR LAW-FEDERAL AND STATE JURISDICTION-
NO-MAN'S LAND AND SECTION 7 01(a).
The power of a state to regulate and offer relief against labor practices
which it considers illegal and contrary to its public policy has been the
subject of considerable discussion and litigation during the past decade.'
Even as many problems have been settled, more have been raised. Almost
as soon as the United States Supreme Court, after a tortuous journey
down the labyrinthian ways from Garner2 and Guss,3 seemed to have
settled the "no-man's land" doctrine in the second Garmon4 case, Con-
gress passed the Landrum-Griffin Act,5 which because of section 701 (a)
has again caused widespread speculation concerning the extent of the
newly acquired power of the states in the former "no-man's land."6 One
of the more important questions raised is whether state or federal labor
law should be applied in the state courts and agencies empowered to
assert jurisdiction by section 701 (a).
However, that there is conflict and unsettledness in this area should
not be surprising. To begin with, the courts are dealing at close quarters
with that "delicately balanced and finely drawn line" of state versus
federal power in an area where exponents of both sides have excellent
arguments to bring before both courts and legislatures. In addition to
this, the politically and emotionally charged concept of the relative ad-
vantages to labor and business of having more or less control exercised
by the states in the field of labor relations is omnipresent. The purpose
of this comment is to present the law as it now stands, and to present a
"non-judicial hunch" as to where it ought to go in the future.7
1. Nine out of the seventeen labor cases heard by the United States Supreme
Court in 1959 dealt with jurisdictional questions.
2. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). A state court's granting
of an injunction was reversed on the ground that the alleged union conduct con-
stituted a federal unfair labor practice and, therefore, the federal remedy was
adequate and exclusive.
3. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957), forbade a state
labor board to exercise jurisdiction over a labor practice which was unfair under
federal legislation.
4. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
5. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (1959).
6. See Papps, Section 701 and the State Courts, What Law To Be Applied?
48 GEo. L.J. 316 (1959), and Reilly, Federal-State Jurisdiction, 48 G~o. L.J. 304
(1959).
7. For comment as to the future course of the law in this area see articles cited
supra at note 6.
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Within the area of federal pre-emption and permissive state action in
labor disputes there are two basic divisions. The first is where the con-
duct regulated is within the jurisdictional standards of the National
Labor Relations Board, and the second, where the conduct is such that the
states are empowered to exercise jurisdiction under section 701(a).
I.
ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE JURISDICTIONAL STANDARDS OF THE NLRB
In the Garmon case,8 the United States Supreme Court finally cleared
away much confusion on the question of federal pre-emption in the labor
field. The Court at last decided to face the basic issue of choosing between
the competing interests of national uniformity and of providing remedies
for private individuals, and held that if the conduct involved is arguably
or potentially protected or prohibited by federal legislation the right of
the states to act has been completely pre-empted.9 In other words, before
the states may act the conduct involved must be clearly neither protected nor
prohibited by the national labor legislation, therefore federal pre-emption
now depends on the type of conduct involved not on the type of relief
sought. Thus, the legal niceties drawn between the state's interest in
regulation and private damages made in Laburnum,10 and the tenuous
distinction between whether the right to be vindicated was of a public or
a private nature found in Russell," have been discarded. Of course, the
problem of determining which activities are neither arguably protected
nor prohibited is now raised. State power in regard to right to work
legislation seems rather clear, 12 and this activity would seem within state
control because of section 14(b) of the Labor Management Relations
Act. 13 There are areas which are far less clear. In the past, such activities
as partial strikes14 and slowdowns 1" were not considered to be protected or
prohibited, however, in these rather indefinite areas one who acts on the
assumption that federal law will not apply certainly assumes the risk of a
future determination that it was applicable.
There are two exceptions to the rule of federal pre-emption which
mark out areas wherein the states may permissively act.' 6 The first of
these applies when the activity involves violence or is traditionally criminal
in nature. Thus, state courts may grant injunctive relief against labor
8. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
9. Id. at 245.
10. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
11. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
12. Al Goma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Bd., 336 U.S.
301 (1949), sustained a state injunction which prevented enforcement of a main-
tenance of membership clause.
13. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 164 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b)(1959); Section 14(b) allows the states to regulate union security measures.
14. 110 N.L.R.B. 1589 (1954).
15. 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1948).
16. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
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violence whenever such conduct threatens personal injury or property
damage,'17 and in addition may award damages for losses resulting from
such activity.' 8 However, the scope of conduct which the states may
characterize as violent will be carefully scrutinized to avoid an overreaching
by the states which would result in frustration of national labor policies.' 9
The second exception to the rule of federal pre-emption, which can
be termed the doctrine of peripheral activity, is based on the Gonzales
case,2 0 which held that an activity only on the perimeter of our national
labor legislation can be regulated by the states. Gonzales was concerned
with the power of the state to give relief against conduct involving internal
union activity. The basis of the holding is that power of the states has
not been pre-empted merely because under certain circumstances there
may be some peripheral remedy afforded federally. Garmon has left
Gonzales substantially intact. 2 1  However, with the provisions in the
Landrum-Griffin Act regulating many aspects of internal union affairs
the permissive area of jurisdiction given appears to have been sub-
stantially contracted.
22
What is only peripheral to federal legislation is rather difficult to
ascertain and at best is subject only to a case by case analysis. Illustrative
of what a state will term peripheral is a Wisconsin case in which a union
imposed a fine on one of its members for crossing a picket line.23 The
court cited Gonzales for its holding that such internal union activity was
only peripherally related to federal legislation. However, it is submitted
that if federal law does not make such conduct an unfair labor practice it
may be inconsistent with a uniform national application of federal labor
legislation to permit a state to characterize this type of conduct as an
unfair practice. Of more doubtful validity are state cases granting reme-
dies for loss of employment due to union opposition to individual workers,
24
and compelling bargaining with a union in the face of an existing contract
with a rival union.
2 5
17. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
18. In UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958), the court recognized state power
to award damages, both actual and purchase, to a non-striking employee whose entry
to work had been prevented by-threats of violence.
19. For an excellent pre-Garmon discussion see Meltzer, The Supreme Court,
Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 59 CoLum. L. Rev. 6,
26-36 (1959).
20. Int'l. Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
21. Indeed, it may well be said that support for the periphery doctrine has been
given by Garmon, because Garmon held that the existence or nonexistence of
parallel remedies is not as important as the regulation of basically the same subject
matter by two different rules of substantive law.
22. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (1959).
23. Joseph Carey, 44 L.R.R.M. 1060 (1959).
24. Sound Technicians v. Super. Ct., 141 Cal. App. 2d 23, 296 P.2d 395 (1956);
MacDonald v. Feldman, 393 Pa. 274, 142 A.2d 1 (1958); Selles v. Local 174,
Teamsters Union, 314 P.2d 456 (Wash. 1957).
25. J. Radley Metzger Co. v. Fay, 4 App. Div. 2d 436, 166 N.Y.S.2d 767
(1957). Arnold Bakers, Inc. v. Strauss, 207 Misc. 752, 153 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Sup. Ct.
1956), secondary pressure by union against customers was enjoined.
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These cases would appear to represent an overreaching of state juris-
diction under the guise that the conduct regulated is only peripheral.
However, it should not be presumed that the states will uniformly attempt
to overexpand the peripheral doctrine. A good example of state restraint
is the case of Wagner v. Hartnett,26 in which the Delaware court held
that the refusal of union membership to a worker was potentially an
unfair labor practice and that primary jurisdiction must be afforded to
the NLRB.27
In addition to the arguably protected or prohibited test another
restraint on state power has emanated from Garmon,28 namely that the
courts should not take the initiative in defining whether the activity
involved was arguably protected or prohibited. Thus, primary jurisdiction
in this matter is conferred on the National Labor Relations Board.29
This conferring of primary jurisdiction on the Board appears to have
been based both on considerations of national uniformity and recognition
of the Board's administrative expertise in the area. Consequently, before
the courts may assume jurisdiction in a labor dispute they would apparently
be required to have a determination by the Board as to the nature of the
activity involved, or, at the minimum, compelling precedent from previous
Board determinations. This causes a problem though, since when the
Board declares that an activity is not prohibited it does not necessarily
decide that it is not protected, and as a result the courts remain with no
compelling precedents as to whether they may exercise jurisdiction. To
eliminate this difficulty perhaps the Board will broaden the scope of its
holdings in order to make clear that activities which it holds not pro-
hibited are also not protected. A more practical as well as probable solu-
tion would be for the Board to issue advisory opinions as it will do now
in cases involving its jurisdictional standards for section 701(a) pur-
poses.30 Again, when there is compelling Board precedent, it appears that
a prior determination on the facts may not be necessary. A recent
Minnesota case, which involved a strike in violation of a no-strike clause
containing no provision for reopening or renegotiation during its term
seems to illustrate this.3 1 The court made the initial characterization and
held that the conduct was not protected nor prohibited by the federal
act and was thus enjoinable under state law. However, even though the
Board's primary jurisdiction was seemingly ignored by the state court,
both the United States Supreme Court3 2 and the Board"3 had previously
26. 153 A.2d 584 (Del. Super. 1959).
27. See also Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. Napoli, 395 Pa. 301, 150 A.2d 546(1958).
28. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
29. Ibid.
30. See text accompanying note 39 infra.31. McLean Distrib., Co. v. Local 993, Brewery Union, 94 N.W.2d 514 (Minn.
1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 917 (1959).
32. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
33. W.L. Mead, Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1955); United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B.768 (1949). But see Local 9735, UMW, 117 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1957).
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declared that a strike in violation of a no-strike clause is not protected
by federal legislation. Therefore, it may be that only in doubtful cases
need the Board's primary jurisdiction be called into play.
II.
FEDERAL AND STATE POWER OVER ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF SECTION 701(a).
In order to rectify the injustices created by the "no-man's land"
doctrine, Congress enacted section 701(a) of the Landrum-Griffin Act.3 4
This section gives the states jurisdiction over labor activity when such
activity falls below the jurisdictional standards set by the NLRB. The
states are empowered to assert jurisdiction even though the activity af-
fects interstate commerce and even though it is an activity arguably
protected or prohibited by federal labor legislation. The NLRB is also
authorized to decline jurisdiction over any labor disputes involving any
class or category of employees where the effect on commerce is not sub-
stantial.33 However, this section marks no retreat by the NLRB in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, because although the jurisdictional standards of
the NLRB may be lowered, they cannot be raised above those in effect on
August 1, 1959.36 In addition, with increased manpower and greater
delegation to the regional offices of the NLRB permitted, it is quite
probable that the standards will be again lowered in the near future.-3
Although section 701 (a) has put an end to the inequities of the "no-man's
land" doctrine it has raised a great many problems of scope and interpre-
tation. For purposes of clarity these will be grouped and discussed as
(A) jurisdictional problems, and (B) the problem of whether federal or
state substantive labor law should be applied by the courts and agencies
empowered under section 701 (a) to assert jurisdiction.
34. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (1959). The pertinent provisions of which are: "Section
14 of the National Labor Relations Act . . .is amended by adding . . .the following
new subsection: '(c) (1) The Board, in its discretion may, by rule of decision or
by published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class of employees, where,
in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not
sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction. Provided, that the
Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it
would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
'(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the
courts of any State or Territory ...from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over
labor disputes over which the Board declines ... to assert jurisdiction.'"
35. Thus, in effect, overruling Hotel Employee's Local 255 v. Leedom, 358
U.S. 99 (1958).
36. In this connection it should be noted that NLRB standards on August 1,
1959, embraced the widest jurisdiction in its history. NLRB Press Release No. 576,
October 2, 1959.37. See McCoid, Notes on a "G String": A Study of the "No Man's Land" of
Labor Law, 44 MINN. L. Rxv. 205, 247-49 (1959).
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A.
Jurisdictional Problems.
The first problem is created by the requirement of primary jurisdiction
enunciated in Garmon,38 that is, the NLRB shall have primary jurisdic-
tion to determine whether a particular dispute is within its jurisdiction.
It appears that this doctrine would also be applicable to activities under
section 701 (a) since there must be an initial characterization as to whether
the dispute in question is below the minimal standards of the NLRB.
However, in response to this problem, the NLRB has announced that in
the future it will issue advisory opinions concerning the application of
its jurisdictional standards on petition of the parties, state courts, or
state agencies.3 9 This pronouncement substantially lessens the practical
importance of the question; on whom does the burden of proving juris-
diction or lack thereof rest? Of more importance is the fact that this
method of proceeding, first to the NLRB for an advisory opinion and
then to the state court or agency, may result in a delay which could prove
exceedingly costly to the aggrieved party in a labor dispute. The solu-
tion seemingly lies in requiring an advisory opinion as to jurisdiction from
the "NLRB only in the most doubtful of cases, especially since there juris-
dictional standards are generally a mere matter of computation.
Another difficulty raised by the act may be termed the problem of
fluctuating standards, that is, if the NLRB lowers its jurisdictional
standards to embrace more businesses will it apply federal law retroactively?
A retroactive application could have the effect of creating an unfair
labor practice out of conduct which was proper under state law at the
time of commission.40 The NLRB has applied federal law retroactively
in the past ;41 however, this can be attributed to an attempt to ameliorate
injustices resulting from the former "no-man's land" doctrine.42 Now,
because of the express power given to the states by section 701 (a), it
seems that a retroactive application of federal law will be made only when
the failure to do so would cause a result completely at odds with our
national labor policies. 43
B.
Application of Federal or State Law.
Section 701 (a) does not specify which substantive law, federal or state,
must be applied by the newly empowered state courts and agencies. The
38. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
39. NLRB Rules and Regs. 8H, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102. 98-104 (1959).
40. Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 13 (1959).
41. Ibid.
42. See Tom Thumb Stores, Inc., 95 N.L.R.B. 57 (1951); Screw Mach. Prods.
Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1951).
43. See Woll & Antoine, Who goes There? Recent Moves Along the Federal-
State Front in Labor Law, 11 SYRACUsg L. Rxv. 1, 10 (1959).
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legislative history, while enlightening, is far from conclusive, and pro-
ponents of each side find support for their separate interpretations from
it. 4
4
As early as 1958, what may be called the Ives Bill contained a provi-
sion which would have required the NLRB to assert all the potential
which it had. 45 Again, in 1959, more bills were before Congress con-
cerning the problem. In the Senate, the Kennedy-Erwin Bill would have
required the NLRB to assert all of its potential jurisdiction, but granted
it power to cede jurisdiction to state agencies when the state law would
not be inconsistent with federal law.40  What finally emerged from the
Senate was a bill which would have allowed state agencies, other than
courts, to assert jurisdiction in instances where the NLRB declined to
do so, but the state agency would have been required to apply federal
law.4 7 Considerable change in the Senate bill was made in the House of
Representatives, one of the chief objections to it being that it only al-
lowed cession to state agencies and not courts, where only a minority of
the states had agencies in any way similar to the NLRB. 48 Basically, in
the House there were two solutions to the "no-man's land" problem put
forth. One was that of Representatives Shelly and Elliot. Their bills
would have required the NLRB to assert all of its potential jurisdiction.4 9'
The other solution was that proposed by Representatives Landrum and
Griffin, which was the solution finally accepted.50 This is fundamentally
now section 701(a), except that in conference the proviso was added
that the NLRB may not allow its jurisdiction to decline further than
its most recent standards. 51
At first glance, the legislative history would appear to au-
thorize the states to apply their own substantive law, however,
this interpretation does not necessarily follow. The debates in the
House over the relative merits of the various bills dealt mostly with
the issue whether the NLRB should be required to exercise the full
measure of its jurisdictional power, or whether the state courts and
agencies should have jurisdiction over areas in which the NLRB would
be allowed to decline jurisdiction.52 It would seem that many who finally
44. In this regard see The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959: Interpretations and Implications, 48 Gto. L.J. 1 (1959).
45. S. 3974, 85 Cong., 2d Sess. § 602(a) (1958).
46. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 60 1 (a) (1959).
47. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1959).
48. CoLo. Rpv. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-5-1 to 80-5-22 (1954); CONN. G N. STAT.§§ 31-101 to 31-111 (1960); HAWAII RxV. LAWS § 90 (1955); KAN. G-N. STAT.
ANN. §§ 44-801 to 44-815 (1949); MASS. GN. LAWS c. 150A (1957); MINN. STAT.§§ 179.01-179.17 (1957) ; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 700-16; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,,§§ 211.1-211.39 (1952); R.I. GN. LAWS ANN. c. 28, § 7 (1956) ; Wisc. STAT.
§§ 111.01-111.19 (1957).
49. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 701 (1959).
50. H.R. 8400, 8401, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 701 (1959).
51. H.R. Rgp. No. 1147, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
52. The final House Report is silent on this matter. See H.R. RxP. No. 1147,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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voted for the Landrum-Griffin Bill assumed that although the states could
now assert jurisdiction they must apply federal law, especially since
throughout the debates over the various bills the need for national uni-
formity was recognized by all sides.58 Thus, it appears, the final deter-
mination is to be made by the United States Supreme Court, with its
choice again depending on a balancing of national uniformity and local
control. 54
One of these considerations is whether to afford federal protection to
employers and employees in small businesses. Many states have prog-
ressed little beyond the conspiracy theory in regard to labor unions.55
Comprehensive regulation of the collective bargaining process in many
states is all but absent, especially in regard to the supervision of repre-
sentative elections and the determination of appropriate bargaining units. 5
There are other states, though, in which the employer in a small business
would receive substantially less protection under state law than he would
receive under federal law.57
That there are conflicting advantages and disadvantages to both labor
and management from the application or non-application of state law
under section 701 (a) illustrates what is the most salient feature of the
issue. That is, local autonomy will favor unions in some states, especially
where unions are already well entrenched, and conversely, will favor
management in other states where there is less union strength. To
generalize that the application or non-application of state law would favor
either labor or management is only to cloud the issue unless the analysis is
made on a state to state basis. Thus, national uniformity seems much more
attractive than local autonomy, an autonomy which would result in the least
protection to the interest most in need of protection. Moreover, merely be-
cause one activity is deemed quantitatively small is not sufficient reason for
discrediting its effect in the aggregate. "Appropriate for judgment is the
fact that the immediate situation is representative of many others through-
out the country, the total incidence of which if left unchecked may well
become far reaching in its harm to commerce."58
53. See Papps, Section 701 and the State Courts: What Law to be Applied,
48 Go. L.J. 316 (1959).
54. See Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. Cni. L. Rtv. 542
(1959).
55. See Blumrosen, Common Law Limitations on Employer Anti-Union Conduct:
Protection of Employee Interest in Union Activity by Tort Law, 54 Nw. U.L. Rtv.
1 (1959).
56. See note 48 supra.
57. E.g., closed shop agreements are permitted in some states. CONN. GzN. STAT.
§ 31-105 (1960) ; N.L. LAB. LAW § 704 (5) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6 (1) (c)
(1953).).
58. Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944).
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III.
CONCLUSION.
At a time when increasing erosion of state power has even given old
friends of federalism cause for alarm, it is difficult to argue for a greater
extension of federal power. However, in the area of labor relations
extended federal power seems only appropriate. The competence of the
states in the collective bargaining process has lagged tremendously be-
hind that of the United States Government. The choice between applying
federal law or state law in the newly empowered state courts and agencies
is a choice between a highly sophisticated body of federal labor law and,
in many states, a few antiquated concepts. Confronted with an ambiguous
legislative history, the United States Supreme Court, in the light of its
past policy of national uniformity, as evidenced by the Garmon case, 59
has an excellent opportunity to further extend that policy in its interpre-
tation of section 701 (a).60
Peter G. Nyhart
59. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
60. For an excellent discussion of these and problems of labor and national
policy generally, see Cox, LAw AND THz NATIONAL LABOR POLICY (1960).
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